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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the decision-making process of a targeted country threatened by a terrorist group. 
This country has the choice between improving his arms, forming an alliance with a border country or negotiating with 
the terrorists. However, his resource do not enable him to have a complete alliance or to pay the total ransom. The 
government has to do an arbitrage among the strategies. After determining the equilibrium, we focus on the effects of 
each parameters.
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     1. Introduction
Nowadays the majority of countries are confronted to the terrorist phe-
nomenon. This threat is omnipresent and this fear has increased in Western
countries since the September 11th attacks. The countries have lots of dif-
￿culties to counter this threat. Attacking a country may turn out to be
easier insofar as a country is delimited by borders. Concerning the terrorist
groups, they are sorely localizable. Therefore, they are sometimes impossible
to neutralize. However, several solutions exist to eradicate this plague or at
least limit the consequences. These solutions divide into two categories: the
o￿ensive strategies and the defensive strategies. Sandler and Arce (2003)
analyzed these various strategies and concluded, through their model, that
the defensive strategies are often privileged. However, it is possible that the
government assigns a part of its budget to the protection and another part
to attack. A mix of these strategies is possible and gets closer to the real-
ity. Moreover, it is inconceivable to bet everything on an o￿ensive strategy
for fear of reprisals if the attack failed and that the terrorist group survives
and counter-attacks. Some authors have studied the role of the alliance in
con￿ict such as Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) who analyzed the free riding al-
liance. Walt (1987) focused on the relationship between Israel and the United
States. Most of the authors analyze the alliance as a mean to have a better
protection. However, a country can decide to negotiate with terrorists and to
form an alliance with them. The negotiation has been essentially studied in
the case of hostage-taking: Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart (1987), Lapan
and Sandler (1988), Selten (1988), Islam and Shahin (1989), Sandler and
Scott (1987), Scott (1991), Shahin and Islam (1992) and Sandler and Enders
(2002). However, a terrorist can ransom not to attack a country.
The main o￿ensive strategies used in the models are principally the attacks
and the in￿ltration. The attack enables the government to weaken the terror-
ists, or even to annihilate them. However, it is di￿cult to attack a group be-
cause of the unknowing of his location. Furthermore, the groups are mainly
organized in networks, making the task even more di￿cult. To destroy a
branch of the network will not prevent the terrorists from stopping their
scheme, unless reaching directly the leaders or the decision-makers, to which
case the terrorist group could disappear. Consequently, the governments
appeal to intelligence services to in￿ltrate the terrorists and to manage to
localize the whole network.
Concerning the defensive strategies, these mainly turn around two axes: the
protection and the alliance with the other countries. If a country cannot
attack directly the group and, consequently, cannot reduce its resources, the
1only solution is to establish an e￿ective protection in order to neutralize the
attack. However, a country does not dispose of su￿cient resources to protect
itself e￿ectively. Furthermore, the protection will not be the same according
to countries due to the functions of protection: for the same level of security,
every country will not assign the same amount to the protection. To remedy
this problem, the threatened countries can appeal to the other countries by
forming an alliance. The alliance has a cost but it is sometimes less than
the potential damages. This arbitration between the acquisition of weapon
to improve the security and the wished degree of alliance has been analyzed
by Sorokin (1994). The choice of the target has not been taken into account
in his model. If a nearby country helps the targeted country and allows him
to neutralize the attack, the terrorist group could have grievances against
the allied country. Another solution to calm the murderous intentions of the
terrorists is the ￿nancing or the alliance with this one. A terrorist group
requires funds to organize an attack. His resources consist of the ￿nancing
by countries, the ransoms and the incomes resulting from illegal activities.
To prevent an attack, a country can decide to become allied with terrorists
or to pay a ransom. This is the purpose of this paper.
2. The Model
Here we consider a constrained optimization model where a country max-
imizes his utility and consequently his security, subject to his budgetary con-
straint. The targeted country is threatened by a terrorist group k. However,
this country 1 can get help from the country 2 with the aim of improving
its protection. The situations illustrated by the ￿gure 1 represent the cases
of total alliance with either the border country or the terrorist group.
Figure 1: Total alliance with a border country or a terrorist group
We suppose that both countries are border but only the country 1 is threat-
ened. The country 2 is neutral but he is ready to help the country 1 in
2exchange for a payment. The terrorist group is supposed localized outside
the borders of both countries. By keeping this hypothesis, we do not di￿er-
entiate the internal security from the border security. Indeed, if a terrorist
group is situated inside a country, he will not be confronted to all the se-
curity. The terrorists promise to give up the attack if the country pays the
ransom. However, the amount asked for the ransom can be very high such
as the country cannot pay. We suppose here that the targeted country is not
rather powerful to protect himself only. In every case, he needs an outside
help. The security of the ￿rst country is equal to the sum of the protection
of this country at which is added the outside help. This protection, denoted
by P1 depends on its cost C1. This function is increasing and concave. The
protection P2 of the second country has the same properties. To improve
his security, the targeted country can decide on the tightness of the alliance,
noted a. According to this degree of alliance, the country receives a part of
the protection of his ally. The help brought by this country is thus aP2, with
0  a  1. In exchange for this help, the bene￿ciary will have to pay an
amount p dependent on the degree of alliance, that is to say ap.
The total cooperation with the terrorist group allows to avoid an attack.
However, if the ransom s is too high, the government cannot satisfy their
request. Consequently, he decides on a level of alliance. The higher this
degree is, the more tension between them the country will reduce. So, it
reduces the intensity of the terrorist attack. The closer the government is
with the terrorists, the more he goes away from the border country: the level
of alliance with the terrorists is designated by (1   a). The amount of the
paid ransom is of (1   a)s. The intensity of the attack is decreasing with
the paid sum. Thanks to this ransom, the government will avoid damages
estimated to (1 a)Mk, where Mk represents the maximal terrorist damages.
For a political or ideological reason, it is possible that the priority of the
terrorists is only this country, even if the country 2 o￿ers his help and im-
proves the security. This model focuses only on the strategic decision of the
￿rst country. Consequently, we suppose that Mk, s, p and C2 are exogenous
variables. The endogenous variables are the level of alliance wished by the
country a and (1   a), as well as the amount assigned to the acquisition of
weapons, C1.
The utility of the ￿rst country is given by:
U1 = S1   Mk with S1 = P1 + aP2 + (1   a)Mk
) U1 = P1 + aP2   aMk
3The resources of the country 1 are not unlimited. As in every country, a
budget is allocated to the defence. This budgetary constraint is denoted by
B1. The resources cannot be negative. It is supposed that B1  0. It consists
of the sum assigned to the protection C1, the amount assigned for an alliance
with the border country (ap) and for an alliance with the terrorist group
((1   a)s): B1  C1 + ap + (1   a)s
The price for forming an alliance is purely positive ( p > 0 and s > 0). The
￿rst country maximizes his utility subject to his budgetary constraint:
max
C1;a
U1 = P1 + aP2   aMk
with respect to B1  C1 + ap + (1   a)s
By determining the alliance tightness with the border country, we can deduct
the level of cooperation with the terrorist group. We take back the protec-
tion functions of Sorokin (1994) respecting the hypotheses of growing and
concavity: P1 = ln(C1 + 1) and P2 = ln(C2 + 1). To solve this constrained
maximization problem, we use the Lagrangian function:
L(C1;a;) = P1 + aP2   aMk + (B1   C1   ap   (1   a)s) (1)
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43. Analysis: E￿ect of the price of the border country alliance
According to the value of the exogenous parameters, the decisions of the
government will not be the same. Several hypotheses has to be predicated
to proceed to the analysis. We suppose that the price of the alliance is
increasing with the protection of the country 2. It means that the country
2 has better resources to proceed to the acquisition of weapons and so to
improve his protection. His resources are generated by his budget of defence
and by the allied contribution. Also, the ransom is increasing with the threat.
If the ransom is high but the terrorist threat and the group are weak, then
the threat is not credible. From it, we deduct that if p > s then P2 > Mk.
Although we suppose that the ransom is too much high to be paid by the
government, we raise this hypothesis in order to distinguish all the possible
cases. The tables from 1 to 4 summarize the various e￿ects of p.
C1 P1 a (1   a) U1
p + + + - +
Table 1: If p > s and s > B1
C1 P1 a (1   a) U1
p + + - + -
Table 2: If p > s and s < B1
C1 P1 a (1   a) U1
p - - + - -
Table 3: If p < s and s > B1
C1 P1 a (1   a) U1
p - - - + +
Table 4: If p < s and s < B1
Four cases are possible. The ￿gure 2 summarizes these situations ( A;B;C;D)
specifying the adopted strategy of the government.
A : The government is confronted to a powerful terrorist group. The ransom
is impossible to pay completely. He decreases his spending of arms to
try to preserve the outside help emanating from his ally. The decline in
arms compensates the increase of the price of the alliance, corresponding
to a higher e￿ciency.
B : Even if the second country increases his price to bene￿t from his services,
the government decreases even more the alliance with the terrorists in
order to increase the alliance with the border country and to increase its
spending in internal protection. Therefore, the terrorists will receive less
money, and, consequently, they will launch a more violent attack. The
5government thinks that the attack will be neutralized by his security, es-
sentially due to the protection resulting from the outside. If the country
2 increases its price, it contributes to a better quality of protection.
C : The negotiation allows to resolve the con￿ict. The government wants to
avoid any kind of con￿ict. His spending in arms is thus decreasing.
D : The government knows that it is possible to pay the totality of the
ransom and consequently to avoid being attacked. The alliance with
the country is useless even if the protection of his ally improves. The
di￿erence between its budget and the ransom will serve for obtaining
new weapons to keep a minimum of internal protection.
Figure 2: Government decision
4. Conclusion
This paper focuses on the governmental decision-making process when
he is threatened by terrorists. He has the choice between having new arms,
forming an alliance with an ally or the enemy. Until his resources are low, his
strategy is a mix of these strategies. However, the ￿rst conclusions concerns
the e￿ect of the price of the alliance withe the border country. This price
is synonym of quality. If this increase justi￿es a better e￿ciency of the
protection, then the tightness of this alliance will be closer. According to the
e￿ect of the other parameters, it could lead to other conclusions.
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